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Abstract
My response to Samuelsson’s (2016) recent essay offers a different paradigm with which to think
about education, deliberative discussion and democracy. I call this paradigm the critique of deliberative discussion. Following Ruitenberg’s application of Mouffe’s critiques of deliberative democracy
to education, the critique of deliberative discussion focuses on what Jameson called the “political
unconscious” of deliberative discussions like those presented by Samuelsson. There is literature that
critique traditionally moderate-liberal notions of deliberative discussion, which Samuelsson defines
his typology: reason, willingness to listen, and consensus. While others, like Ruitenberg, have developed this critique of deliberative-democratic citizenship education, the critique of deliberative discussion takes a left-of-liberal view of each of Samuelsson’s requirements for deliberative discussion
listed above and describes practical-pedagogical techniques, which teachers and facilitators can use
to practice critical discussions. This response’s contribution to the debate is therefore not only to critique deliberative discussion but also—following Samuelsson—to offer techniques that translate the
critique into classroom practice.

This article is in response to:
Samuelsson, M. (2016). Education for deliberative democracy: A typology of classroom discussions.
Democracy & Education, 24(1), Article 5. Retrieved from http://democracyeducationjournal.org/
home/vol24/iss1/5

S

amuelsson’s (2016) “Education for Deliberative
Democracy: A Typology of Classroom Discussions” is
a neat essay. First, the author mapped out criteria for
what counts as deliberative democracy in theory, surveying an
important field of philosophical and political scholarship. Next,
Samuelsson sculpted three requirements out of this theoretical
literature, which actual classroom discussions—flesh-and-blood
people, learning together—might satisfy or not, making their
discussions more or less deliberative-democratic. These three
criteria are: (a) the reason-giving requirement wherein different
points of view are presented, each of which being underpinned
with reasons that participants put forth; (b) the reflective requirement, where participants display a willingness to listen to and
think about one another’s reasons, as well as revise these reasons if
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new information becomes convincing; and (c) the striving for
consensus requirement, where participants attempt to formulate
compromises given existing disagreements, from which a unanimity may emerge.
Drawing from observation work in the field, Samuelsson
(2016) gave concrete examples of discussions that exhibit one or two
of the requirements, distinguishing these discussions from the most
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deliberative-democratic discussion, which includes all of them. The
essay is neat, in the sense that the pieces of the argument fit together
and achieve the stated goal, all within its stated political paradigm.
My response in this essay is not to take issue with any given part of
Samuelsson’s argument per se but to offer another paradigm with
which to think about education, discussion, and democracy. I call
this paradigm the critique of deliberative discussion. Following
Ruitenberg’s (2009, 2010) educational application of Chantal
Mouffe’s (2000a, 2000b, 2005a) critiques of deliberative democracy
(and peripherally Dryzek’s [2000] critique), the critique of deliberative discussion paradigm will be more critical than Samuelsson’s.
By critical, I mean to signal an interest in left-of-liberal thinking
about language, politics, and education. In a word from Frederic
Jameson, the critique of deliberative discussion focuses on the
political unconscious of deliberative discussions like those presented
by Samuelsson.
Ruitenberg (2009), for instance, drew from Mouffe’s critique
of Rawlsian deliberative democratic citizenship to critique
accounts like Callan’s (1997), calling for an education of political
adversaries rather than an education for justice as reasonableness.
Rather than a deliberative model of democratic education, Mouffe’s
model is agonistic, revolving around the “dimensions of antagonism inherent in human relations” (Mouffe 2000b, p.15, Ruitenberg
2009, p. 2), out of which Ruitenberg crafted a radical political
education. Elsewhere, Ruitenberg (2009) developed a Mouffian
response to deliberation that emphasizes affect and fantasy in
citizenship education, focusing on communication, though she did
not focus specifically on classroom discussion. (Englund [2012,
2016] defended deliberative democratic discussion from such
critiques and is relevant to consider as well—see below.) In general,
Ruitenberg’s engagement with Mouffe critiqued traditionally
moderate-liberal notions such as reason, reflection, and consensus
in democratic educational theory, and I draw from hers as well as
other agonistic resources such as psychoanalysis, critical race
theory, and Marxist philosophy of language to critique Samuelsson’s three criteria for deliberative classroom discussion. While
Ruitenberg’s work focused on citizenship, this response follows her
paradigm of critique to engage with Samuelsson’s literature on
classroom discussion.
At least with respect to Samuelsson’s (2016) three criteria
(reason, willingness to listen, and consensus), following Ruitenberg’s critique of citizenship education, it is similarly necessary to
articulate critical perspectives on discussion and democracy that
do not make the same assumptions that Samuelsson’s literature
makes, drawing as it does from Rawls, Habermas, Guttmann, and
Thompson. Doing so can also have practical pedagogical outcomes. In what follows, I aim to sketch a few of the critical theoretical notions mentioned above, drawing from Ruitenberg, the
sources mentioned, and matching them with pedagogical techniques when teaching with and for discussion (Parker & Hess,
2001). The sketch presented here of the critique of deliberative
discussion is only that, and must be brief. This brief critique of
deliberative discussion should be read like a blueprint for a larger
project of critiquing moderate-liberal accounts of discussion
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 1

which aim at democracy through deliberation. To complete the
blueprint, I take each of Samuelsson’s requirements, describing a
critical-theoretical perspective on each, including responses to
such critiques by Englund (2006, 2009, 2012, 2016), and finally
recommending a pedagogical technique consistent with the
critique.

Giving Reasons
Deliberative discussion’s emphasis on giving reasons tends not to
mention emotion, by which I mean feelings, desires, drives, affects,
and other interior modes/moods that are not conscious, rational,
or reasonable. People in discussion feel things as well as think
things, and insofar as democracies include flesh-and-blood people
rather than minds one-dimensionally wired for giving reasons, it
behooves us to consider what those emotions are like during
discussion: namely, what is happening for participants unconsciously when they put forth reasons. Ruitenberg (2009) drew
from Mouffe’s psychoanalytic influences to critique deliberative
democracy from this perspective. “As psychoanalysts realized long
ago,” Ruitenberg wrote, “the suppression of fundamental desires
and emotions will not make those desires and emotions disappear,
but only defer their manifestation” (p. 3). From this insight, Mouffe
worried that repressing desire and emotion can lead to tribalism.
When it comes to classroom discussion, though, this deferred
manifestation can directly contradict the supposed democratic
character of the discussion, but in a different way than Mouffe’s
worry about tribalism. Theories of discussion like the deliberative-
democratic model that advocate the suppression of desires (see
Englund below) can overlook monarchical tendencies in group
dynamics, no matter how much emphasis teachers place on
rational deliberation. To see exactly how this works, I would
consult Freud’s (1975) Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.
Freud claimed throughout his oeuvre, and in this helpful book in
particular, that people in groups are not merely conscious minds
pursuing rational interest. They also have an unconscious inner
lives that inform their behavior. These unconscious lives are driven
by love, desire, and sexuality. Freud noted some trends in how
psyches (conscious minds and unconscious inner lives) operate
when they get together in groups. One thing psyches do is fall in
love, become attached, and project previous love-loss experiences
onto others in the world, particularly those with authority. When
several psyches, like students, do this together with the same
person, like a teacher in a classroom, the psyches become partially
hypnotized by the person in charge, which alters the way they
think and react. Student psyches can tend to treat the teacher like
a parent figure, desiring the teacher or identifying with them or
rejecting them. The students then treat one another like siblings
(see Britzman, 2003). Reason has very little to do with this process
and, if left unchecked, can quickly create a monarchical classroom
politics where the teacher is a king-father (Backer, forthcoming).
Giving a reason is never as simple as giving a reason, and
democracy is different than monarchy. To have democracy in the
classroom discussion, while taking students’ emotional life into
consideration, the teacher should redirect students’ emotional
tendencies toward the classroom demos, or its people rather than a
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singular leader. In other words, teachers should encourage students
to talk to one another more than with the teacher themselves.
Englund (2012) wrote that the critique-from-emotion against
deliberative democratic classroom discussion is misplaced,
however. He did recognize that the “role of rational, ideal conversation might work as an instrument of power for the teacher” (p. 4).
He cited Bernstein and made a Deweyan move away from traditional distinctions between reason and emotion, claiming that
deliberative-democratic classroom discussion should be founded
on an embodied intelligence.
Yet the Deweyan sidestep is more of a repression than a
solution. Calling for embodied intelligence and asking us to
collapse the difference between reason and emotion are insufficient
responses to Freud’s theory of the unconscious. Ignoring the
unconscious has more than theoretical consequences: It has
practical consequences in classroom. Monarchical tendencies in
classroom discussion have been born out in the research on
distorted classroom discussion, which the deliberative-democratic
tradition rarely mentions. If educational discourse analysts from
1968 until 2003 are to be believed, the majority of allegedly democratic discussions in United States classrooms may actually be
monarchical recitations precisely because students focus on
teachers more than one another (Hoetker & Ahlbrand, 1969;
Nystrand, Wu, Gamoran, Zesier, & Long, 2001). Emphasizing
student-to-student interaction to facilitate against their unconscious investment of the teacher with monarchical power is only
one of a suite of considerations regarding the ways power can
complicate reason-giving in discussion, but considering the
unconscious lives of discussion participants as they put forth
reasons while encouraging reason-giving can help to avoid the
distortion of discussion into recitation (Backer, 2014).
How can teachers do this, exactly? Harkness pedagogy is a
helpful resource (Backer, 2015). One technique Harkness teachers
use to get students focusing on one another rather than only the
teacher is writing down everything that students say. If a teacher is
busy writing down student comments, then they cannot make
suggestive eye contact, respond immediately, or otherwise dominate the discussion and become classroom monarchs. Taking
copious notes extends wait time, makes the teacher’s attention
unavailable for emotional and intellectual dependence, and focuses
the teacher’s attention on students’ own words. Another technique
is the check-in. At the beginning of a discussion, students should
somehow (with a partner or to the whole class or to themselves) say
their names and how they are feeling. Engaging with students’
emotions explicitly at the beginning of a discussion can correct the
sometimes unconscious forces that drive reason-giving during
discussion, something deliberative discussion tends to leave out of
the picture (Backer, 2016).

Willingness to Listen
Samuelsson’s (2016) reflective requirement entails a willingness to
listen to others’ reasons in discussion. But not all students and
teachers will be willing to listen to one another equally: They may
be sexist, racist, classist, xenophobic, homophobic, ableist, or
otherwise discriminatory against one another’s identities.
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Deliberative democracy tends to downplay how racialized, classed,
and gendered identities prevent harmonious interaction, rarely
mentioning that it may be difficult for a man to listen to a woman
putting forth reasons, or difficult for a White person to listen to a
Black person putting forth reasons, a trans person to a cis person,
and vice versa. Solnit (2014) has popularized the term mansplaining
to refer to the way men speak in privileged ways, for instance, and
conversation analysts have demonstrated the many ways gender
influences speech habits (Tannen, 1993). Often, advocates of
deliberative democracy like Englund reduce these critiques to identity politics. But this is misleading. As Ruitenberg (2010) pointed
out, “liberalism, in its emphasis on the individual, has underestimated the importance of belonging to collectivities”
(p. 3). Focusing solely on the individual is a predictable move for
liberal-deliberative theories. What they call identity is also group
membership, and people who participate in discussions belong to
collectivities whose habits, epistemologies, and histories can
diverge dramatically—even to the point where it is difficult to listen
to people who belong to different collectivities, particularly
oppressor collectivities.
Hooks (2003) has described how people from her African
American and lower-class background did not talk the same way as
upper-class White students at Stanford University. As a professor,
she noticed that her students discriminated against certain raced
and classed forms of talking:
I have found that students from upper-and-middle class backgrounds
are disturbed if heated exchange take place in the classroom. Many of
them equate loud talk or interruptions with rude and threatening
behavior. Yet those of us from working-class [and African-American]
backgrounds may feel that discussion is deeper and richer if it arouses
intense responses . . . Few of us are taught to facilitate heated
discussions that may include useful interruptions and digressions, but
it is often the professor who is most invested in maintaining order in
the classroom. (p.148)

Hooks highlighted two sites where identity makes it difficult
to be willing to listen given the racial and class positions of discussion participants. The first site is the student-student exchange.
Upper-class students may be “disturbed” by working-class speech
patterns, equating it with “rude and threatening behavior.” If a
student feels threatened or offended because of class differences in
speech, it will be difficult for that person to be willing to listen to
whatever reasons that speech puts forth. The second site is the
teacher-student exchange. What a teacher perceives as an interruption or digression or disruption, for instance, may be a racial or
classed pattern of speech that is earnestly, in its distinctive style,
putting forth reasons. If the teacher is not willing to listen to that
kind of talking, then a willingness to listen fails. In addition to
commenting on her students as a teacher, hooks also elaborated on
how her university classroom was not a welcoming place for her to
express herself when she was a student, and teachers must be
cognizant of the ways they and their students discriminate against
certain ways of speaking that are raced, classed, and gendered.
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How to do this? Progressive stack is one discussion tactic
from Occupy Wall Street that addresses this problem of exclusion
in communication. Ask participants to raise their hands before
speaking and then write their names down on a list. This list is the
“stack.” Participants who identify as belonging to historically
privileged groups (White, able-bodied, heterosexual, cis-gendered,
middle-class men) make sure to let others who do not identify with
such historically privileged groups speak before the former. Rather
than a universalist approach to deliberation where all are equals,
using progressive stack takes a reparations approach to deliberation. Students with traditionally marginalized heritages have not
historically had the opportunities to express and develop their
thinking in discussions, particularly in higher education contexts.
The progressive stack redresses this historical imbalance. Of
course, classrooms are different spaces than social movements like
Occupy Wall Street. Teachers should use the progressive stack
alongside clear preparation and scaffolding, including workshop
activities that set a groundwork for understanding gender and
racial privilege as it operates in communication. I like to use
McIntosh’s (1988) “Knapsack of White Privilege,” along with
practicing I-statements that encourage students to communicate
both feelings and reasons in reaction to points made during
discussion.
While liberals like Englund (2012) have claimed that teachers
should “hesitate in promoting” such “passionate” considerations of
identity (p. 4), critical educators like hooks know that such
considerations must be part of pedagogy to counter-interpellate
the layers of violent injustice enacted by governments and economies against diverse groups. What is “suitable” for Englund looks
to critical educators like a call for a politics of respectability in
classroom discussion.

Consensus
Like reason and willingness to listen, consensus is vulnerable to
critique from the left as well. Ruitenberg generally has oriented her
engagement with Mouffe’s critique of deliberative democracy
around agonism, or the antagonism constitutive of human
societies. Mouffe’s pluralist politics leads to a radical-democratic
form of citizenship education, an agonistic approach including
“those types of conflict that would put into question the basic
institutions of democracy (Mouffe 2005a, p. 120, in Ruitenberg
2009, p. 6) and the fundamental ‘ethico-political’ principles of
liberal democracy” (Mouffe 2005a, p.32, Ruitenberg, p. 6). While
Ruitenberg has proposed three areas for political education rooted
in Mouffe’s approach, classroom discussion is not one of them. It
would be not a stretch of the imagination to infer that consensus-
seeking deliberative discussion is inconsistent with the agonistic
approach, or at least the critique of deliberative democracy. To
develop this inference further and extend Ruitenberg’s proposals
for a radical-democratic education to classroom discussion, one
avenue to explore is the way consensus supports what Lyotard
(1984) called metanarratives.
Habermas’s (1975) writings have contained, as Samuelsson
(2016) noted, a hallmark theory of consensus-seeking deliberation.
Lyotard’s (1984) Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge is,
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among other things, a response to Habermas’s argument about
consensus-seeking speech acts during deliberation in Legitimation
Crisis. One of postmodernism’s founding texts, Lyotard’s book
focuses on language games, Wittgenstein’s metaphor for ordinary
speech. Lyotard reminded us that language games have rules but
argued that these rules are determined by powerful interests. There
is a general agonistics in communication, he claimed, a large-scale
struggle among competing social forces, over which language-
game rules should be followed in discourse. This general agonistics
happens in political campaigns, commercials, news media, and
classrooms as well. Who decides what is a sensible thing to say, for
instance? Where do the terms of debate, presuppositions, and
questions come from in classroom discussions? Lyotard has
claimed these nuts and bolts of discourse—the very words we
use—derive from metanarratives, big-picture stories, and ways
of thinking about social life. The metanarratives at work in the
school’s wider social context tend to set the table for discussion
(though participants can be creative with what they find on the
table). For Lyotard, the economic metanarrative of postindustrial
and financial capitalism decides at least some of the rules of the
language game we play in classrooms. Maybe these rules can be put
on the table and examined in the classroom through the right kind
of discussion. However, consensus-seeking discussions may not be
that kind of metanarrative-examining discussion. Looking for
consensus may yield the kind of ideological resonance that leaves
the general agonistics over language-game rules hidden from view,
and permits those with power to win the struggle by default.
Uncritical consensus-seeking can be like forfeiting a competition
to secure one’s vision of the world.
Englund (2012) chastised such critiques of consensus,
however, as being unjust. Making reference to Erman (2009),
Englund claimed that “deliberation [is] constitutive of conflict, i.e.
starting from different, struggling views,” (p. 4). To Englund, who
has cited Habermas and Guttman, deliberative discussions are
constituted by “different views . . . confronted with one another
[where] arguments for these different views are given time and
space to be articulated and presented in the classroom” (p. 3).
While discussants may have differing perspectives, and these
perspectives can conflict with one another in discussion, Englund
missed the point of the critiques of consensus. People who
confront social struggles and participate in discussions are
different than people whose perspectives confront one another in
discussion. The latter is an intra-discussive feature: It is an aspect
of the perspectives at play during any given discussion, namely
whether these perspectives are in agreement or not. Thinking only
about the confrontation of different positions during deliberation,
in a classically liberal way, puts out of sight the material conditions
of discussants’ existences and the extra-discussive social forces
that impact (and can be impacted by) their discussion. Conflicting
views that confront one another during discussion may be a
certain kind of “struggle,” but it is very different than the ways
discussants themselves live with class conflict as workers, racial
struggle as people of color, and gender oppression as women and
queer folk. Lyotard’s point is that such struggles determine the
rule of language games that speakers play, which Englund’s
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response did not address. Rancière’s (1995, 2015) work on dissensus
is a helpful resource here. Rancière’s idea of democracy casts the
demos as a disruptive problem for existing social forces. In
Rancière’s terms, consensus-seeking talk will probably not disrupt
what is sensible to say. Disrupting existing social forces requires
dissensus rather than a perpetual attempt to agree. The kind of
deliberative discussion Samuelsson advocates may fit into this
nondisruptive category.
How to question metanarratives in classroom discussion?
The Brazilian philosopher of education Walter O. Kohan practices
a pedagogical technique called collective questioning that permits a
disruption of the sensible and does not seek consensus, but rather
holds questions and tensions during the discussion. At the start of
a discussion, ask students to go around and offer a question about
the text or subject matter. It is important to only permit questions rather than comments or arguments. Next, write these
questions down so that the group can see them clearly. Then,
as a group, everyone (teacher included) thinks about connections
between these questions. Then the teacher may ask, “Which
question should we start with?” or “Who would like to begin?”
Haroutunian-Gordon (2014) practices a similar kind of questioning for discussions where students interpret literature. This kind of
collective questioning prioritizes questioning for its own sake,
tension, and aporia rather than consensus, compromise, or
decision-making.

Language Is Ideology
In general, the critique of deliberative discussion follows the same
path as Ruitenberg’s critique of deliberative-democratic citizenship education. Just as Mouffe’s agonistic approach to democracy
is a critical alternative to Rawls’s and Habermas’s deliberative
tradition, the critique of deliberative discussion is a critical
alternative to the deliberative tradition of classroom discussion
attributed to Guttman, Thompson, and Englund. The critique of
deliberative discussion takes a different paradigmatic approach to
language and its relationship to politics. One way to think about
the critique of deliberative discussion is by placing a new emphasis
on ideology and language. Rather than thinking of language as a
mode of communication through which, if practiced in a certain
way, individuals can make informed decisions about controversial
issues—that is, as nonideological speech—
the critique of deliberative discussion holds that all language is
ideological. What is said, thought, and heard registers participants’
imagined relations to real social conditions, and these imagined
relations are alive and at work during discussion, rather than
bracketed. The ideological quality of discussion may be unconscious; it may operate through identity and difference among
participants; or it may operate in the rules of language games
established by metanarratives that set the table for discussion.
Elaborating how language is ideological, the French Marxist
philosopher Jacques Lecercle (2006) gave the example of “the cat is
on the mat,” a sentence used in books that teach young children
about grammar. An example of a sentence that appears not to have
any political quality, “the cat is on the mat” is actually rich in
connotations, setting its speaker and listener within an
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institution—i.e. a relationship of places (‘we lay down the rules of
grammar here [at school]’ . . .) and hence a power relation. It
imposes on both of them the self-evidence of its transparency
(which is a symptom of ideology in the traditional pejorative sense
of the term), starting with the child who must copy it, illustrate it,
and learn it by heart at school. This sentence clearly illustrates that
ideology is language and language ideology; it is the product of a
collective assemblage of enunciation (it does not—and never
will—have an author); it has served to interpellate generations of
school kids as speakers. (Lecercle 2006, p. 172)
Even the most apparently apolitical utterances set speakers
within institutions and power relations just by saying them, like
between students who unconsciously project monarchical powers
onto teachers. These allegedly apolitical sentences, particularly in
classrooms, always imply commands, and impose the kind of
self-evidence and transparency which accompanies ideology (like
metanarratives). Whenever students and teachers sit down to
have a discussion, their sentences are laced with ideological
meanings, couched in ideological imperatives, and layered with
ideological histories.
Defending the deliberative discussion from such critiques,
Englund’s (2012) imperative is for teachers and students to “learn
‘to live educationally,’ to continuously reconstruct our experiences,
using the results of that experience to shape subsequent experiences” (p. 8). For Englund, living educationally requires three
things: first, using “deliberative communication first to create a
deeper learning [such] that the learners themselves verbalise their
arguments and their knowing” (p.8); second, creating “a sense of
community at different levels, both within the classroom and in
relation to the greater society which the school class is a part of ”
(p.8); third, developing students’ “judgement ability” in navigating
the fact/value distinction (p.8). (These come from Englund’s
comments in response to Ruitenberg. For more on Englund’s
position itself, see Englund 2006, Englund 2009, and Englund
2016.) Yet in each case, there is no awareness that language—the
very stuff of deliberation—is soaked in ideology. Imagined
relations to real social conditions are embedded in arguments and
knowing, shapes our understanding of the school’s relationship to
society, and constructs teachers’ and students’ abilities to judge.
Deliberation is shot through with ideological meanings that
present in discussions which deliberative-democratic theories of
classroom discussion rarely acknowledge. Even the most apparently apolitical utterances come from somewhere—words themselves are social entities without single authors—and then go on to
interpellate speakers and listeners. Deliberative discussions such
those elaborated by Samuelsson (2016) do not think of language as
ideological in this way. On the other hand, the critique of deliberative discussion takes language as ideological (just as Ruitenberg’s
Mouffian critique of citizenship takes democracy as agonistic),
holding that unconscious drives, identities, and metanarratives are
at work in classroom discussion.

Conclusion
The purpose of this response paper is make another paradigm of
thinking available to readers interested in thinking about
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classroom discussion and democracy. Samuelsson’s (2016) essay
has provenance in the Rawlsian and Habermasian traditions of
deliberative democracy, articulated by Guttman, Thompson, and
Englund, which prioritize giving reasons, willingness to listen, and
consensus as hallmarks of deliberative discussion in the classroom.
This neat formulation is just one paradigm of thinking about what
is at stake democratically during classroom discussion. Another
paradigm, which I have called the critique of deliberative discussion, offers a different perspective following Ruitenberg’s work on
radical democratic citizenship. The critique of deliberative
discussion highlights the unconscious and emotional lives of
participants in discussion, how drives and desires can influence the
democratic quality of interaction while giving of reasons. The
critique names the tensions among identities in discussion,
specifically the way race, class, and gender undermine participants’
willingness to listen to one another during discussion. Finally, the
critique of deliberative discussion understands consensus in the
context of a general agonistics over the rules of language games,
acknowledging how metanarratives set the table for discussion,
guiding what counts as a legitimate and sensible statement during
classroom discussion. In general, the critique of deliberative
discussion holds that language is ideological and that therefore
classroom discussion is enmeshed in political struggle. Techniques
and practices such as the Harkness pedagogy, check-ins, progressive stack, and collective questioning can help teachers practice
the critical paradigm. The techniques help us walk the walk that the
critique of deliberative discussion recommends. Speaking from my
own experience as a teacher, these techniques can create a tangibly
different kind of democracy in the classroom. When teaching with
the critique of deliberative discussion, democracy becomes a
radically participatory activity engaging students’ desires, struggles
with identity, and focuses on dissensus and disrupting problematic
consensus in society rather. Democracy in this paradigm is a
demos, and the critique of deliberative democracy makes space for
this demos in classroom discussion.
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